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Liability of Auditors
*
By Sir Nicholas Waterhouse
All of you are no doubt familiar with those fascinating mystery
stories at the end of which the brilliant amateur detective con
founds the painstaking inspector by pointing to the perpetrator of
the crime and at the same time to some small step which the in
spector might have taken and thereby have placed himself on the
sure road to discovery. When this denouement occurs it counts
for nothing that the inspector has taken all those steps which ex
perience has shown to be most likely to result in detection of such
a crime as has been committed, nor is it deemed relevant that to
have taken all the unlikely steps, one of which, as it turns out,
would have resulted in discovery, would have necessitated the
employment of men and time to an extent far beyond his re
sources. He is left to bear with what equanimity he can com
mand the tolerant superiority of the amateur and the more open
scorn of the minor characters in the story.
The feelings aroused in readers of such tales vary—some are
lost in admiration of the achievements of the brilliant amateur;
others feel a certain sympathy with the criminal whose well-laid
plans have been frustrated by the combination of a seemingly in
consequential error and the uncanny intuition of his nemesis; few
waste any sympathy upon the discomfited inspector. But among
those few (if it be true that a fellow feeling makes us wondrous
kind) should be found those readers who happen to be profes
sional auditors of accounts. For if they have been so fortunate
as to enjoy a considerable practice, they are almost certain to be
reminded of occasions on which they have vainly attempted to
explain the fact that a defalcation undiscovered by them has been
perpetrated in connection with accounts which have been sub
jected to their audit. At such a time the sufferer from the defal
cation is apt to be unable to see anything except the one fact that
an apparently simple step, involving perhaps no great amount of
work, would have led to the detection of the fraud. Patiently,
but with small hope of success, the auditor explains that the steps
which he did take would in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases be
* An address delivered to the London members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales, January 18, 1934.
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more likely to prove effective, and that if he had done all the many
things that might possibly have unearthed the defalcation, the
scope and extent of the audit would have been extended beyond
all reason. Delicately he points out things which the client him
self or his staff might have done which would have made such a
defalcation impossible or resulted in its discovery.
The analogy is not perfect. In the mystery story it is not sug
gested that the unsuccessful inspector should be cast in pecuniary
damages for his failure or even that he should lose his position.
The auditor is lucky if he is not confronted with both these
suggestions.
In justice to one’s clients let me say that many of them, when
satisfied that the auditor has served them loyally and carried out
his duties conscientiously, are willing to take a reasonable view of
such a case. There are, however, exceptions, particularly in those
cases where to absolve the auditor from blame is to imply that the
directors themselves were negligent, or where the fraudulent em
ployee has been the subject of a fidelity bond and the insurer
refuses to accept liability until it has been proved that the auditor
has not been negligent. The professional auditor is then at a dis
tinct disadvantage and the case is made more delicate and difficult
for him by the fact that his principal asset is his reputation and
that resistance to the claim may result in damage to that reputa
tion, whether or not it results in a pecuniary liability.
Now, the lawyers may tell us that this is wholly a matter of con
tract, express or implied, and that it is for the accountant to see
that the respective rights and obligations of his clients, the in
surers and himself are defined to his satisfaction. I think that in
cases in which the auditor is retained expressly to make an inter
nal audit it is possible at the time of making the contract to define
his position in the unfortunate event of a defalcation taking place
and escaping detection by him. And, in passing, may I say that
he should not accept a contractual relationship under which he
may be held pecuniarily liable if he fails to live up to the standards
of effectiveness set by the heroes of detective fiction.
For the present, however, I should like to direct your attention
to the narrower question which is presented when the auditor is
appointed under the companies acts and assumes purely statutory
obligations. Since the question has not been settled by legal
decisions, and since I am not a lawyer, I am not going to under
take to define the legal position. I am going to put before you
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only the view suggested by my knowledge, inherited or acquired,
of the history of the law, and by my experience in the field of
business as well as in that of auditing.
The protection of a company against risks of fraud by its em
ployees, the detection of frauds which occur and the recovery of
whatever reparation can be obtained, are obviously purely ad
ministrative functions. The problem of safeguarding transac
tions is always a matter of weighing the risks of loss against the
costs of protection and, therefore, a matter lying wholly in the
field of business judgment. The detection of frauds is usually
most likely to be accomplished by continuous supervision which,
unless the volume of business is small, can best be given by per
sons regularly employed for that purpose. Indeed, modern
developments, and particularly the increased use of mechanical
devices, while resulting in greater economy, accuracy and expedi
tion in the field of bookkeeping, have undoubtedly made the
detailed audit which is not continuous and practically contem
poraneous with the transactions audited extremely difficult and
expensive.
It can not, therefore, be questioned that apart from the statute
the work of detecting fraud falls on the directors and on those
whom they employ. Nor is there, I think, the slightest ground
for a suggestion that the audit provisions of the companies acts
have in any degree changed this position.
The provisions of the companies acts relating to the duties of
auditors are of course familiar to you, but it may be desirable here
to recall the precise language in which they are expressed in
section 134 (1) of the act of 1929, as follows:
“The auditors shall make a report to the members on the ac
counts examined by them, and on every balance-sheet laid before
the company in general meeting during their tenure of office and
the report shall state—
“ (a) Whether or not they have obtained all the information
and explanations they have required, and
“ (b) Whether in their opinion the balance-sheet referred to in
the report is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs
according to the best of their information and the ex
planations given to them and as shown by the books of
the company.”
The sole objective of the auditor’s work which is indicated is the
formulation by the auditor of an informed opinion on the question
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whether the balance-sheet of the company exhibits a true and cor
rect view of the state of the company’s affairs. This is a far less
onerous task than for the auditors to satisfy themselves as far as
possible (the limitation is inescapable) whether all the transac
tions of the company have been faithfully recorded and all funds
honestly administered.
Attempts are sometimes made to impose the more onerous
responsibility on the auditor by inference. The auditor must see
that the balance-sheet is exactly correct (so runs the argument)
and it can not be correct unless all the transactions are correctly
reflected therein: therefore the auditor must do everything in his
power to satisfy himself that all the transactions are honestly and
properly recorded. This argument not only overstates in its
premise the express requirements of the act, but in its conclu
sion violates the principles which govern the construction of
statutes.
If parliament had intended to impose the more onerous duty on
auditors, it would have done so in express terms: it would not have
defined the minor obligation and left the major obligation a mat
ter of inference. The contrast in this respect between the general
companies acts and acts such as the building societies act of 1874
or the friendly societies act, 1896, is striking and significant.
Section 27 of the latter act reads in part as follows:
“Sec. 27. Every registered society and branch shall once in
every year . . . send to the registrar a return ... of the
receipts and expenditure, funds and effects of the society or
branch as audited.”
“Sec. 26. The auditors shall have access to all the books and
accounts of the society or branch, and shall examine the an
nual return mentioned in this act, and verify the annual
return with the accounts and vouchers relating thereto, and
shall either sign the annual return as found by them to be
correct, duly vouched and in accordance with law, or
specially report to the society or branch in what respects
they find it incorrect, unvouched or not in accordance with
law.”

It would have been easy to embody similar language in the gen
eral company law, but this has never been done, no doubt for the
simple reason that it was not necessary to the accomplishment of
the purpose which parliament had in contemplation; viz., a rea
sonable measure of protection for members against deception or
other wrongful acts on the part of directors and officers. It was
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no part of this purpose to assign to the members and the auditor
appointed by them duties which properly belong to the directors.
The origin and development of the audit imposed by section
134 (1) of the act of 1929, which perhaps for the sake of brevity I
may allude to hereafter as the “official” audit, is fairly sum
marized in Spicer & Pegler’s Practical Auditing, 3rd edition, page
13, as follows:
“The fact that the whole control of the company was vested in
the directors rendered it necessary that some means should be
utilized of enabling the shareholders to be assured that the ac
counts presented to them by the board correctly represented the
state of affairs of the company and that the directors had not
utilized their position for the purpose of misappropriating the
funds of the company or using them for their private gains. It
was impracticable however for every individual shareholder to
satisfy himself on these points, for as a rule he was not possessed
of the requisite technical knowledge and the right of inspection
and enquiry could not be given to one shareholder without it being
granted to all. Consequently, it became usual for shareholders
to appoint one or more of their number to act as auditor or audi
tors of the company and to report to the shareholders on their
examination of the balance-sheet and accounts. Subsequently it
was found inadvisable to confine this function to individual
shareholders who might not be possessed of the requisite quali
fications, and it became usual to appoint professional auditors to
act on behalf of the shareholders generally.”
In discussions of this subject a statement by the late Professor
Dicksee is sometimes quoted to the effect that the object or scope
of an audit may be defined as threefold: (1) detection of fraud;
(2) detection of technical errors; (3) detection of errors of
principle.
This language, however, occurs in the course of a discussion on
auditing in its broadest sense, and when an accountant is specifi
cally employed to make a complete internal audit it is, I think,
applicable. It is, however, I suggest, wholly inappropriate in
relation to audits under the companies acts. Indeed, Professor
Dicksee goes on to say quite correctly: “The extent of an audi
tor’s duties depends entirely upon the express or implied contract
between himself and his client.”
I suggest that the scope of the official audit is rather:

1. To ascertain whether any balance-sheets or other accounts
submitted to members are in accord with the books of ac
counts from which they would ordinarily be made up.
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2. To reach by examination and enquiry a reasonably in
formed opinion on the question whether the books are so
kept that a true and correct view of the state of the com
pany’s affairs can be obtained therefrom.
3. To determine whether the directors and officers of the com
pany in preparing from the books the balance-sheets or
other accounts and submitting them to members have
dealt fairly and honestly with the members.
The duties imposed on the auditors by section 134 (1) in respect
of accounts other than balance-sheets are quite indefinite. The
auditors are not expressly required to examine any other ac
counts. If they do so they must report on them, but the nature
of the report to be made is not indicated as it is in the case of the
balance-sheet. Where, however, accounts are so closely related
to the balance-sheet as to constitute a part of the information
given to members in relation to the state of the company’s affairs,
the auditor will be wise to regard them for this purpose as a part
of the balance-sheet.
The auditor must not form his opinion lightly, but he is not re
quired to know everything that there is to be known about a
company before he does so.
The duty imposed on the auditor has remained substantially
unchanged from the enactment of the companies act of 1862
(table A) to the present time: there is nothing to indicate that in
the intervening seventy years the conception of the role of the
members’ auditor has been materially changed. It may be noted,
however, that changes such as the substitution of the word
“report” for the word “certify” do not suggest any enlargement
of the auditor’s obligation.
No one would propose that in the case of large undertakings the
auditors, as an incident to the determination of the state of the
company’s affairs, should undertake to duplicate the work done
by the internal auditing department of the company. The law
makes no distinction between large and small companies and the
only interpretation of the act capable of general application is that
it leaves the responsibility for the internal audit to the directors
and their appointees.
It is quite true that in the case of small companies the mainte
nance of an elaborate organization such as would afford adequate
internal checks might involve undue expense, and it is doubtless
generally true that in such cases economy and efficiency can best
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be combined by arranging for continuous or frequent checks of
the accounts by professional accountants. Moreover, the most
convenient and economical course for the directors to adopt will
usually be to retain for such a purpose the professional account
ants who act as statutory auditors of the company. But I sub
mit that there is a clear distinction between the work done by the
accountants upon the instructions of the directors, practically as a
part of the internal machinery of the company, and the work which
falls to them as statutory auditors. If in such a case a defalca
tion occurs and escapes detection, questions may arise concern
ing the liability of the auditors. The first will be whether there is
any liability in respect of their position as statutory auditors or
whether the liability arises from their employment by the directors.
In my view the question of defalcations arises in connection
with the official audit only incidentally in cases where one effect of
the defalcation is that the balance-sheet (or an account so related
thereto as to come within the scope of the auditors’ report) is in
correct to a material extent, as, for instance, where debts carried
as assets have in fact been collected and the proceeds appropriated
by the defaulter.
In considering the position of a statutory auditor in relation to
a defalcation, the vital question would seem to be whether a rea
sonable enquiry into the state of the company’s affairs would
have disclosed the over-statement and consequently the defalca
tion. If so, the auditor will no doubt be liable for the conse
quence of his failure to detect the over-statement of assets, but
the question will still remain how far the fact that if he had done
so further defalcations might have been prevented can properly
be taken into account in assessing damages against him.
It is difficult to see how any claim could be asserted where the
defalcations have been covered up in charges to expenses ac
counts so that the assets are not overstated and where the profitand-loss account shows a single figure of profit “after deduction of
all losses and expenses.”
The extent of the auditors’ liability arising out of employment
by the directors will turn on the nature of their contract.
A number of cases in which claims against auditors for non
discovery of defalcations were based on their contract of employ
ment have been before the courts, but I know of no case in which
such a liability has been asserted against an auditor in respect of
his purely statutory duties under the companies act.
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We are all familiar with the language in the decisions in the
London and General Bank case and the Kingston Cotton Mills case.
In those cases the auditors had been misled into making reports in
which, as subsequently appeared, the assets were grossly over
stated—a matter upon which they were required by the express
terms of the act to report. When it is recalled that even upon
this issue the court used such language as:
“He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in
whom confidence is placed by the company”;
“He is entitled to assume that they are honest and to rely upon
their representations provided he takes reasonable care”;
“Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking down in
genious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing
to arouse their suspicion and when these frauds are perpetrated
by tried servants of the company and are undetected for years by
the directors”;
“Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very little enquiry
will be reasonable and sufficient and in practice I believe business
men select a few cases haphazard, see that they are right and as
sume that others like them are correct also”;

it would seem safe to assume that the court would not hold an
auditor to a higher standard of responsibility in respect of duties
which are not mentioned in the act and the assertion of which is
an attempt greatly to extend by inference the express require
ments of the act and to transfer to the appointees of the members,
duties and obligations which naturally and logically attach to the
directors and those appointed by them.
I should not like it to be thought for a moment that in my view
a statutory auditor need feel no concern as to the degree of effi
ciency of the protection afforded by the company’s methods
against defalcations by employees or that he should take no
steps to satisfy himself that the system is being carried out in
practice. On the contrary, an auditor, even if undertaking
nothing more than the official audit, should always examine the
methods of control and test their working before he accepts the
books as a basis for a balance-sheet which he proposes in his re
port to approve as exhibiting a true and correct view of the state
of the company’s affairs. An auditor who had signed a balancesheet which had been proved to be substantially incorrect and
sought to defend himself on the ground that the balance-sheet was
in accordance with the information and explanations secured by
him and was as shown by the books of the company would find his
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defence gravely compromised if it were demonstrated that the
accounting methods and control of the company were so lax and
inadequate that no reliance could properly be placed upon the
books.
Not only so, but while the auditor may properly refuse to ac
cept a pecuniary responsibility which does not justly attach to his
work, he has (if, as is now customary, he is a professional ac
countant) an obligation to make his work as valuable to his clients
as possible within the limits of his appointment. His expert sur
vey of the methods employed and the moral effect of intelligent
tests of the working of the system, restricted though those tests
may be, will exercise a valuable deterrent influence. I believe
that the purpose of the modern criminal law is to act as a deter
rent, the punishment of the individual being regarded as necessary
to this purpose rather than retributive. No one denies, just be
cause crimes are still committed, that the law and the police have
such an effect nor can the deterrent effect of audits be denied
because defalcations still occur.
The correct view of the relation of the shareholders’ audit to the
question of defalcations by employees is, I suggest, that it has this
by no means inconsiderable preventive value, but it involves no
sort of guaranty nor any undertaking to be responsible for the con
sequences if in a particular case such an audit neither prevents
nor discloses a defalcation. It should not be relied on to disclose
defalcations except so far as discovery would be a natural result
of any reasonably adequate enquiry into the state of the com
pany’s affairs. If the directors desire further protection in the
form of supplementary service by the auditor, the extent of the
protection and the corresponding liability become matters of
contract.
In the United States I believe there is no official audit, but the
question of the scope of an examination sufficient to warrant a
report by auditors, somewhat similar to that called for by our
statute, has received considerable attention in recent years. As
early as 1917, the question what examination was sufficient to
justify certificate of a balance-sheet for credit purposes was con
sidered by the federal trade commission (a body somewhat
analogous to the board of trade) and by the federal reserve board
(which supervises the federal banking system) and a pamphlet
was issued by the latter body in that year and was revised in
1929. During the current year the New York stock exchange has
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indicated that it regards the scheme of examination outlined in
that pamphlet as justifying certification of the balance-sheet for
submission to shareholders. It is interesting to note that in the
first paragraph of this pamphlet it is stated that the procedure
outlined “will not necessarily disclose defalcation,” so that ap
parently the view in America is that an examination which is not
sufficiently extensive to ensure the disclosure of defalcations may
be entirely adequate as a basis for reporting to shareholders
whether a given balance-sheet exhibits a correct view of the finan
cial position of the company. Anyone who has read the pam
phlet will, I am sure, share that view.
What, then, should be the nature of the contract between the
company and the auditor? Obviously, there must be a wide
range in the scope of usefulness of the professional auditor in vary
ing circumstances. The principal determining factors are, per
haps, the size and number of individual transactions and the
extent of the internal audit. A company with a small staff enter
ing into a relatively small number of important transactions may
prudently instruct the auditor to make the most complete veri
fication possible. Conversely, a company with a large staff,
entering into a larger number of relatively small transactions,
should rely mainly on a proper subdivision of work and internal
audit and ask the auditor to do no more than to satisfy himself
thoroughly of the theoretical effectiveness of the internal system
and make such tests of its practical working as will convince him
that it is being made effective in practice. Between these limits
varying degrees of completeness in the work of the auditor may be
appropriate.
Naturally the fee and the degree of responsibility assumed must
both vary as the audit is more or less extensive. And on this
point I should like to say a word of caution to the practising ac
countant and especially to those beginning practice.
We sometimes hear complaints that after a defalcation has been
discovered clients take a view of the extent of the work which the
auditor should have performed which is far more comprehensive
than that which they took when instructing him and arranging
the fee. The auditor should avoid the corresponding unfairness
of leading his client to expect a greater degree of protection than
the procedure he proposes to adopt will in reality afford. Today,
the value of the work of auditors is too highly appreciated for it to
be excusable for the auditor to emulate the share-pusher and at101
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tribute to his work a value greater than it can be expected to
possess.
However extensive his work, an auditor should not be expected
to agree to assume a pecuniary responsibility for losses which
might have been avoided had he discovered a defalcation which
for a time escapes detection, without regard to the amount of the
loss or to the ingenuity of the methods employed by the defaulter
or to the fact that the directors or employees of the company may
by their acts or negligence have contributed to the successful
concealment of the irregularities.
This is essentially a risk to be covered by an insurance, the
amount of which is predetermined and the cost or premium com
mensurate with that amount. The audit should greatly reduce
the risk and therefore the necessary premium, but it should not
be regarded as in the nature of insurance or reinsurance.
It is an entirely mistaken notion, which is, however, held by
some people, that an auditor is legally liable for the amount of any
defalcation which occurs after the date of an audit at which he
might have discovered that one was being perpetrated, without
regard to the difficulties of detection or to the extent to which the
directors may have contributed to the loss by their acts or negli
gence. No cases involving this question have, I believe, reached
the higher courts, but in the London Oil Storage Company case
(1904) it was considered very carefully. That case was tried by
Lord Alverstone, and Mr. Rufus Isaacs (now Lord Reading) was
counsel for the auditor. The neglect complained of was failure
at any time to verify a petty-cash balance which over a period of
years had increased from about £100 to nearly £800. It was
thus a step which might be regarded as incidental to a determina
tion of the state of the company’s affairs. The auditor was ap
pointed under the articles of association, which were rather more
stringent than the provisions of the present statute. In his
charge to the jury, the lord chief justice said:

“The conduct of the directors is no answer to any breach of
duty by the defendant, but it is a circumstance you must take
into consideration, because if you are of opinion that the loss was
occasioned by a man stealing the money in consequence of there
being a want of proper control over him, then the fact of there
being a breach of duty by the auditor is what we lawyers call a
4 causa Causans ’ which contributed to but would not be the cause
of the loss. I do not know that I ever remember a question the
solution of which was more difficult in the concrete. It is easy to
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put it in general terms: Was he guilty of breach of duty, and if so,
what loss was occasioned to this company by that breach of duty?
You must not put upon him the loss by reason of theft occurring
afterwards or before, but you must put upon him such damages as
you consider in your opinion were really caused by his not having
fulfilled his duty as auditor of the company.”
The jury found that there was a breach of duty extending over
four years, but they assessed the damages at only five guineas, add
ing that they considered the directors to have been guilty of gross
negligence. In the course of the subsequent discussion of the
judgment to be entered, the lord chief justice said:
“It was not a case in which Mr. Hasluck had said (as he might
have said quite honorably, I think): ‘My clerk was careless but
the directors so acted that it caused the company no damage.’ If
that had been the way the case had been fought, I think Mr.
Isaacs’ contention would have been unanswerable, and that the
action ought not to have been brought.”

In one of the decisions of our court of appeal which I have
already quoted the following sentence occurs:
“If there is anything calculated to arouse suspicion he should
probe it to the bottom, but in the absence of anything of that kind
he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful.”
I have been surprised to find this language interpreted as
meaning that when once an auditor’s suspicions are aroused he
must as a part of his statutory duty and without special compen
sation continue his investigations until he has found the truth,
however deeply it may be buried.
I do not think that many clients would take such a view. Most
of them would, I feel sure, be appreciative of the vigilance of the
auditor which had resulted in discovering the defalcation and be
content themselves to bear the expense of investigating its extent
and its effect on the state of the company’s affairs. In any case
it is satisfactory to find that Lord Alverstone lent no support to the
exaggerated view of the auditor’s duty, for, after quoting the
language above cited, he said:

“And apart from the circumstances of this case, I think Mr.
Hasluck made an answer which shows that he appreciated his
duty when he said, ‘Had I any reason to think that the amount of
cash retained at the city office was too much, I should have gone
to the directors and asked for an explanation: that would have
been my duty’; and so far as I may express an opinion, I think
that is a true view of what his duty would have been under the
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statute and the articles. He ought if his suspicion was aroused
by anything that was called to his attention, to have gone to the
directors and asked for an explanation.”

Some years ago an interesting American case was reported in
the Accountant. The auditors of a New York stockbroker’s firm
receiving an annual fee of not more than $2,000 were sued for
damages and at the end of the trial the judge finally left to the
jury two questions:
(1) Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their
agreement, and (2) If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted
directly and proximately from such negligence? The first ques
tion was answered in the affirmative, and to the second the jury
answered "$1,177,805.26."
Afterwards, however, the court set aside the answer to the
second question and directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in
the amount of $2,000. Upon appeal, the appellate division of the
state of New York, by a majority of three to one, sustained the
decision of the lower court, and in doing so, said with regard to the
damages of $1,177,805:
“We think the damages can not be said to flow naturally or
directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract.
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for losses which they
could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.”
The Court of Appeals of New York, a court which I believe
possesses an authority in America only less than the Supreme
Court of the United States, unanimously confirmed the decision of
the Appellate Court.
Quite recently, the court of appeals of Manitoba gave a
decision in an extremely interesting case (International Labora
tories Limited v. Dewar et al). In the court of first instance the
judge made a number of decisions adverse to the auditors which, if
they had been sustained, would, I think, have made a complete
reconsideration of the legal position of auditors inevitable.
The company was a subsidiary with no stockholders except the
holding company, and the audit arrangements had been made by
correspondence with the officers of the holding company and con
firmed by those of the subsidiary. The auditors had undertaken
a restricted audit, after warning their clients of the risks such
restriction entailed. The loss was covered by insurance, and it
was admitted that the suit was brought in the interest of insurers.
The defalcations were ultimately discovered by the auditors, who
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were instructed by the company to investigate the records and
determine the amount stolen.
The trial judge, that is, the judge of the court of first instance,
dismissed the correspondence from consideration, holding that it
was ineffectual to relieve the auditors of a duty which was imposed
on them by the statute, the proper performance of which would,
in his view, have resulted in the prompt discovery of the defalca
tions in the first year in which they occurred, that the auditors
were consequently liable for the amount of all subsequent de
falcations and that the insurers were entitled to recover upon the
principle of subrogation. How extreme were his views on the
responsibility of auditors may be judged from a single sentence
quoted from his decision:
“When the defendants assumed their duties and continued to
carry them out from year to year, the necessity for special vigi
lance by the plaintiff as against its employees was removed.”
Fortunately for the profession, and as I think, for the business
world also, the appeal court disagreed with the trial judge on his
law as well as on his interpretation of the evidence. With one
dissentient out of five judges, that court completely reversed the
decision of the court below and decided the issues in favor of the
auditors, both on the claim and the counter-claim for services in
investigating the thefts. The dissenting judge would have found
for the plaintiff on certain items constituting about one-third of
the total claim.
All of the judges founded their decisions on the contract created
by the correspondence. With the exception noted, all agreed that
there was no breach of duty under that contract. Since this
conclusion disposed of the case, all further observations are in the
nature of obiter dicta. Nevertheless, it seems worth while to
quote the two following excerpts:
“The liability sought to be imposed on the defendants is, in this
view, based on the failure of the defendants to protect the plain
tiff from its own negligence.” (Trueman, J. A.)
“There is a certain minimum of control which every firm is
bound to exercise over the operations in its office and which the
auditors will properly assume to have been exercised.” (Prender
gast, C. J.)

I do not think that the burden placed on the auditor is un
reasonable, in theory, even under a contract express or implied
that required from him far more than the official audit. He is
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required to display only reasonable skill and reasonable diligence :
he is not liable merely because he fails to discover a most in
genious fraud and if the primary cause of the loss is negligent
administration, his liability will, in law, be relatively small.
What, then, are the reasons that make the question of liability a
serious one?
The first is that, as stated by Lord Alverstone in the passage
which I have already quoted, it is easier to define the auditor’s
liability in general terms than to deal with the question concretely.
Consequently, the auditor is in the hands of a jury, and unless
their decision is quite unreasonable it will not be interfered with.
The second is that the question whether a fraud might have been
discovered by reasonable skill and diligence is apt to take on a
very different color when the fraud has, in fact, been discovered
and the means by which it might have been unearthed earlier have
become apparent. It is too much to expect of jurymen that they
should be able to put themselves back into the position of the
auditor before the discovery had been made. In the third place,
the question what constitutes reasonable skill and diligence is
always a difficult one. The courts have indicated that such a
question can best be answered by ascertaining whether other skilled
persons would have regarded the procedure actually followed as
adequate or whether they would have done something more which
would have prevented or reduced the loss. It is easy to be
wise after the event, and an expert may be prone to think that he
would have done what as it turns out would have been effective;
or, on the other hand, he may find it embarrassing to say that he
would have done something which another expert, whom he re
gards as equally competent, did not do. Answers to hypotheti
cal questions after the event are not a very satisfactory basis
on which to have to depend for a decision whether a loss which
may be disastrous is to fall upon an auditor.
Undoubtedly, however, the consideration which adds most to
the seriousness of the question of the liability of an auditor is that
he has much more to lose than the person asserting the claim
against him and that claimants can not fail to be aware of this
fact. The mere fact that a suit for negligence is brought against
him is apt to prove injurious whatever the outcome may be; and,
if he loses, the damages and costs may be out of all proportion to
any compensation he has ever received. There is no doubt that
recognition of these facts has led to claims being made and paid
106

Liability of Auditors

that could scarcely have survived scrutiny in a court of law.
It follows, I think, from the foregoing that the remedy for un
satisfactory conditions lies not in changes of the law but mainly
in ourselves. If we are careful what contracts, express or im
plied, we enter into; if we do our work with reasonable compe
tence and diligence; if we make up our minds to face the trouble
and annoyance which resistance to unfounded claims will some
times entail, we have little to fear.
I think, however, that the organized bodies of the profession
should do something to place the relations between clients,
insurers and auditors on a more satisfactory footing. In the
Manitoba case which I have mentioned, Mr. Justice Robson said:
“Much has been said about subrogation and suggestion that
the insurers now have a right through plaintiff against defendants.
I fail to see anything of the sort in the relationship of the parties.”
If this is not the legal position in England steps should be taken to
make it so, and I should suppose that this could readily be ac
complished by appropriate wording in contracts of insurance.
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